Stage 3 · Saadia Gaon (882–942)

Emunot v'Deot: IV:4 · God Does Not Compel

כתאב אלאמאנאת ואלאעתקאדאת — The Book of Beliefs and Opinions

Emunot v'Deot in the original Judeo-Arabic, with a working English translation by Eliyahu Freedman (working draft). Hover a phrase to see its English light up; tap any word for a gloss.

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Section 4. I say further: the Creator (His glory is great) has no hand in people's acts in any way — He does not compel them to obedience, nor to disobedience.

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I have evidence for this from the path of sense, from the path of reason, and from the scriptures and traditions.

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As for the path of sense: I find that a person is aware from within himself that he can speak and can remain silent; can hold and can let go

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— he feels no other force opposing his will whatsoever. There is nothing to it except that he govern his nature with his reason: if he follows that, he is prudent; if not, he is ignorant.

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For when the Creator refrains from creating bodies and what is in them, that refraining has no opposite. But when a person refrains from acts, he refrains only by choosing to do the opposite.

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If he does not love, he hates; if he does not accept, he is angry — he has no station between the two.

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I should also clarify: a person does nothing except while choosing to do it — it is impossible for one who has no free choice to act, or for one who is not choosing.

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This is why we see that the law does not impose full punishment on one who does something reprehensible in error — not because he lacked free choice, but because he was ignorant of the cause and reason.

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The preceding established that one act cannot have two agents. Whoever supposes that the Creator (mighty and exalted) compels His servant to something has made a single act belong to both of them.

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Furthermore: if He were to compel him, His command and prohibition would be meaningless. And if He compelled him to do something, He could not justly punish him for it.

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Furthermore: if people were compelled, reward would be owed to the believer and the unbeliever alike — since each labored at what he was put to use for. Like a wise man who employs workers, one to build and another to demolish, who would owe wages to both.

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Furthermore: compulsion entails excuse. Since it is known that a person cannot overpower his Lord's strength, if the unbeliever were to excuse himself saying he could not believe, he would have to be right and his excuse accepted.

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As for scripture: we have already cited 'choose life' (Deut. 30:19); and what was said to the wrongdoers: 'Has this come from your hand? Does God show you favor?' (Mal. 1:9).

And where the Creator made explicit His disavowal of their sins, saying: 'Ah, rebellious children, declares the LORD, who carry out a plan, but not Mine; and who make an alliance, but not of My spirit' (Isa. 30:1).

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From the traditions: what the early sages transmitted — 'Everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven' — citing: 'And now, Israel, what does the LORD your God ask of you, but to fear' (Deut. 10:12).

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God marveled at this matter and said: 'Have I any pleasure in the death of the wicked?' (Ezek. 18:23). The second: He affirmed it could not be — 'For I have no pleasure in the death of anyone' (Ezek. 18:32). The third: He swore an oath — 'Say to them, as I live, declares the Lord GOD, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked' (Ezek. 33:11).

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Perhaps someone will say: if it is as has been shown — that He does not desire the sin of a sinner — how can there be in His world something that is not good or something He is not pleased with?

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The answer to this is close at hand: what seems strange to us — that a wise ruler allows in his realm what he does not want — is only strange in the case of a human being, since a person hates something only when it harms him.

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Our Lord does not hate these transgressions for His own sake — no accident can befall Him — but He hates them for us, because they harm us.

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Perhaps he will also say: since He knew in advance what would be, He knew the person would disobey Him — therefore the person must disobey Him, so that what He knew may be fulfilled.

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Resolving this doubt is even clearer than the first. He who says this has no evidence that God's knowledge of things is the cause of their being — it is only conjecture or deliberate assertion.

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— for if God's knowledge of something were the cause of its being, things would be eternal and pre-existing, since His knowledge of them is without beginning.

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Rather, we believe He knows things according to the true reality of their being. What He produces, He knew He would produce; what a person will choose, He knew the person would choose.

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If he says: if God knew that the person would speak, can he remain silent? — we say explicitly: if the person were to remain silent instead of speaking, then the original premise would be that God knew the person would remain silent.

English is a working draft — alignment is sentence-by-sentence.