Stage 3 · Saadia Gaon (882–942)

Emunot v'Deot: IX:7 · Why It Is Eternal

כתאב אלאמאנאת ואלאעתקאדאת — The Book of Beliefs and Opinions

Emunot v'Deot in the original Judeo-Arabic, with a working English translation by Eliyahu Freedman (working draft). Hover a phrase to see its English light up; tap any word for a gloss.

Layers
Pageרעז

Aligned sentence by sentence

. . , ,

Chapter 7. As for the fifth and sixth questions — the necessity of the eternal nature of reward for the righteous and punishment for the wicked — I address this by way of reason and say:

, ,

When God made obedience to Him obligatory for humans, He was obliged to motivate them with the greatest possible incentive — for if He motivated them with only a partial incentive and they still did not obey, one could argue that had He offered more, they would have obeyed.

. , , ,

But when He motivates with everything, no excuse remains. By way of illustration: had He set the duration of reward at a thousand years, one could argue that some people abstained because they deemed that period too short,

, , ,

and likewise two thousand, and likewise three thousand — for any finite amount the mind can conceive of a greater amount beyond it.

, .

But when He makes their reward without end and unceasing, and their bliss imperishable — no room remains for the one seeking an excuse to find one.

, , ,

One might say: I can accept this regarding reward, since it is grace, happiness, and beneficence — but regarding punishment and eternal fire, I see it as abandoning mercy and as cruelty unworthy of His character. Regarding this I also offer a decisive reply:

Pageרעח

Aligned sentence by sentence

,

Just as He was obliged to motivate them with an incentive that could not be greater, so He was obliged to deter them with a deterrent that could not be greater,

, ,

for if He threatened them with punishment of a hundred years or two hundred years and they did not desist, one could argue that had He set it at a thousand years, they would have been deterred —

, .

and likewise two thousand — one could always argue that a still larger number would have frightened them. Therefore He made punishment without end, so that the deterrence be maximal, leaving no one with grounds to persist in disobedience.

,

Since He threatened them with the utmost warning and they did not accept it, it is impermissible for Him to contradict what He promised them — lest His word be false.

, , ,

Rather, so that His word and report be vindicated, He must consign them to the house of punishment — and the blame falls on them, for they were disobedient and disbelieved.

, ,

And He has the merit of beneficence — for His intent in making punishment eternal was to reform them toward obedience.

, , , , , , .

This is analogous to all the things in this world that He created with wisdom, yet which turn harmful through human error — such as going out at night, descending into a pit, eating food at the wrong time, treating oneself with what is harmful, and the like.

, ,

I further say that scriptural evidence for this is found — first in His saying: וְאֵלֶּה לְחַיֵּי עוֹלָם וְאֵלֶּה לַחֲרָפוֹת לְדִרְאוֹן עוֹלָם ["And these to everlasting life, and these to disgrace and everlasting contempt"],

, .

and: נְעִמוֹת בִּימִינְךָ נֶצַח ["eternal pleasures at Your right hand"], and עַד נֶצַח לֹא יִרְאוּ אוֹר ["they will never see the light"].

,

And when He said: וְאַתָּה הוּא וּשְׁנוֹתֶיךָ לֹא יִתָּמּוּ — and followed it with: בְּנֵי עֲבָדֶיךָ יִשְׁכֹּנוּ וְזַרְעָם לְפָנֶיךָ יִכּוֹן ["But You are He and Your years will not end... the children of Your servants will dwell, and their seed will be established before You"],

.

this statement establishes that just as His (mighty and exalted) endurance is permanent without interruption, so too the endurance of the righteous is permanent without interruption. If

Pageרעט

Aligned sentence by sentence

?

an objector objects here and says: just as creation may endure with Him at the end of time without end, might it also be valid that creation had always existed with Him at the beginning of time without beginning?

, ,

I will clarify the difference between the two propositions and say: it is impossible for creation to have always existed alongside its Creator without beginning —

,

for every maker must necessarily, in any statement, be posited as prior to what he makes.

,

And once the maker precedes it, each day we observe — through our reason — that he is capable of preserving it on that day; so we observe him also as capable of preserving it another day,

, , .

and once it is guaranteed that He will do so, He continuously extends this — every day adding another day, every moment adding another moment. The mind denies none of this but accepts it.

, , ,

If one says: what is the difference then between the Creator and the created? — I say: this question does not deserve an answer.

, , ,

For what resemblance is there between the soul and body — which require time and space, which experience pleasure, which have commands and prohibitions, which need a preserver to preserve them

, .

and the One who is above all these things and their like? The creature stands before Him like one whose sustenance and very self depends on what He renews for it — as stated: וְזַרְעָם לְפָנֶיךָ יִכּוֹן ["their seed will be established before You"].

English is a working draft — alignment is sentence-by-sentence.