Aligned sentence by sentence
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Tractate Sanhedrin. Chapter One.
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Mishnah 1
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*Monetary cases.* These include cases of robbery and of injury, without doubt; except that all monetary cases other than robbery and injury may be adjudicated by three judges who are not experts (*mumḥin*), or by a single judge if he is an expert authorized for the public (*mumḥe la-rabbim*).
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The meaning of "expert authorized for the public" is that one whose learning and excellence in the science are widely renowned among the public, as that learning is known to the scholars who examined him and ratified his rulings.
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But cases of robbery and injury are adjudicated only by three experts. For this reason the language is divided, and the Mishnah does not simply say "monetary cases—robbery and injury—by three."
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Know, too, that no one is designated an expert of a court (*bet din*), entitled to adjudicate cases of robbery and injury, except one who has validly received ordination (*semikhah*) in the Land of Israel from the court that is there in Syria.
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As for his statement *damage and half-damage*: this is on the view that damage and half-damage belong to the general category of injuries. For when he wished to treat of the categories in which the perpetrator is fined more than the harm he inflicted—namely the double payment and the fourfold and fivefold payments—he also treated of the case in which the offender is fined less than what he destroyed, namely half-damage; and on account of half-damage he mentioned full damage as well, on the view that it belongs to the general category of injuries.
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And once he had spoken of these fines, he spoke of the remaining fines: the seducer, the ravisher, and the defamer (*motzi shem raʿ*)—the one who lodges a claim concerning virginity (*taʿanat betulim*) but whose claim is not substantiated.
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Rabbi Meir says he is judged by three, since he incurs no more than lashes (*malqut*) (JA: *malqut* (מלקות). Lashes—the corporal punishment short of death.) and a fine of one hundred *kesef*, and this is permissible before three. But should the matter develop into a capital case (*dine nefashot*), twenty are added to the three [making twenty-three].
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The Sages, however, do not permit this, lest a slur be cast upon the first three—that they were not experts, or that they were disqualified—and for this reason the Sages increased the number of judges. Rabbi Meir does not heed this apprehension.
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The ground for these matters being heard before three persons is the word of God concerning monetary judgments, *unto the judges (ʿad ha-elohim)* (Exodus 22:8), which is not fewer than two; and it is among the principles of our Law that the number of judges must always be an odd number—since, when a disagreement arises among them concerning a ruling, the majority must necessarily concur upon one opinion while the minority hold the contrary, and we follow the opinion of the majority, as the Law has bound us to do by His saying *after the many to incline* (Exodus 23:2). For this reason a court may not be fewer than three. And the law is not according to Rabbi Meir.
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Mishnah 2
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They said in the *baraita*: How so? Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With three they begin; with five they deliberate and conclude; with seven [they finalize]. If one says to convene and two say not to convene, the individual is nullified by his minority. If two say to convene and one says not to convene, two are added to them and they deliberate the matter.
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If two say it requires intercalation and three say it does not require intercalation, two more are added to them. So when they reach seven, they continue to deliberate until four concur upon some course, upon which they concur and act. And the law is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
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Mishnah 3
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*The ordination of elders (semikhat zeqenim)*: this is the advancement of the scholars, and the allusion to it is His saying *and he laid his hands upon him and charged him* (Numbers 27:23). We, however, do not require an ordination by [physical] hand; rather, the person fit to be advanced is told by the court that advances him: "Rabbi So-and-so, you are ordained and permitted to adjudicate cases of fines (*dine qenasot*)." That person thereby becomes ordained, is styled *elohim*, and may adjudicate all cases.
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This can take place only in the Land of Israel; they said: There is no ordination outside the Land. It is not required that both the one advanced and the one who advances him be in the Land of Israel together; rather, once a man has obtained ordination in the Land of Israel, he may adjudicate cases of fines even outside the Land, for it is among our principles that the Sanhedrin functions in the Land and outside the Land, as will be explained further on.
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As to whether the three [who ordain] must themselves be ordained for it to be valid for them to ordain another—on this there is doubt. What appears from the Talmud is that their chief must be ordained, and he then adjoins to himself two others and advances whom he will.
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I myself hold that if the entire body of the disciples and the scholars agree upon advancing a certain person in the academy (*yeshivah*), making him head—on condition that this be in the Land of Israel, as we have noted—then that person's place in the academy is validated, he becomes ordained, and he may thereafter ordain whom he will.
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For if you do not affirm this principle, the existence of the Great Court could never be possible, since every one of its members would necessarily have to be ordained, beyond doubt; yet God has promised their return in His saying *and I will restore thy judges as at the first* (Isaiah 1:26).
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Perhaps you will say that the Messiah will advance them even though they are not ordained—but this is impossible, for we have already explained at the head of our work that the Messiah neither adds to the Law nor diminishes from it, neither in the written nor in the transmitted [tradition].
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And I hold that the Sanhedrin will return before the appearance of the Messiah, and that this will be among his signs. He said *and I will restore thy judges as at the first, and thy counsellors as at the beginning; afterward thou shalt be called the city of righteousness* (Isaiah 1:26). This will take place, without doubt, when God sets aright the hearts of men, when their goodness and their longing for God and for the Law increase, and when their rectitude grows great before the coming of the Messiah, as is clear in the texts of Scripture.
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He said concerning the heifer whose neck is broken (*ʿeglah ʿarufah*): *and the elders of the congregation shall lay [their hands]* (Deuteronomy 21:6). Rabbi Yehudah says: *and they shall lay*—not fewer than two; *the elders*—not fewer than two more; and since a court may not be evenly balanced (that is, that its number be odd), one is added—so three. Rabbi Meir holds: *the elders*—two; since a court may not be evenly balanced, one more is added [so five]. And the law is according to Rabbi Yehudah.
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As to his statement *ḥalitzah by three*: this is what is strictly required, though we ourselves perform *ḥalitzah* by five, merely for the publicizing of the matter (*gilluy milta be-ʿalma*). We have already explained in the thirteenth chapter of Yevamot that the refusal-of-marriage (*miʾun*) is valid before two.
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His statement *the [fruit of the] fourth-year planting (neṭaʿ revaʿi)* means the redemption of the fourth-year planting. And *the second tithe (maʿaser sheni) whose value is not known*: this is when that fruit has begun to spoil, so that one then requires merchants to assess the extent of that spoilage.
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His statement *the consecrated things (heqdeshot) by three* means: one who wishes to redeem something of the consecrated things in which redemption is possible—namely what was consecrated for the upkeep of the Temple (*bedeq ha-bayit*)—requires three to assess the value of that thing.
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Likewise, one who says "my valuation (*ʿerki*) is upon me," and the priest comes to exact from him his valuation: if he has movable goods, the amount of his valuation is taken from him on the word of three that that thing is worth the valuation set upon him. And if he has nothing but land, his valuation is likewise taken from his land, on the word of ten persons one of whom is a priest, that that land is worth the valuation set upon him.
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So too, one who says "my monetary worth (*damay*) is upon me," who must be assessed like a slave sold in the market—he too is assessed by ten persons one of whom is a priest, and they pay over what they declare it to be worth. This is the meaning of his statement *and a person likewise (ve-adam ka-yotze ba-hen)*: that the assessment of a person is like the assessment of landed property.
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Mishnah 4
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He adduced as proof the verse *and ye shall slay the beast* (Leviticus 20:16). For if you say that *and the beast* serves to inform us that a beast, too, incurs being put to death, and not for an analogy (*heqqesh*), this is unnecessary, since with us the slaying of the beast is explicit—His saying *then thou shalt kill the woman and the beast* (Leviticus 20:16).
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The statement of Rabbi Eliezer, *whoever is first to kill them has gained merit*: if one [of the parties] has killed one of them, then whoever slew it has gained merit before Heaven, [though] not before a court. Rabbi Akiva holds that the snake's death does not [require] twenty-three; rather, a single person may kill it. The ground for capital cases [requiring] twenty-three will come further on. And the law is according to Rabbi Akiva.
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Mishnah 5
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The law of a tribe (*shevet*) is that when an entire tribe is led astray, it is judged only by the Great Court, on account of His saying *then shalt thou bring forth that man or that woman* (Deuteronomy 17:5)—it is only individuals, such as a man or a woman, that are put to death *within thy gates* by a court of twenty-three; but the whole of the tribe—not so, rather by the Great Court.
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The false prophet (*navi sheqer*) we learn from the rebellious elder (*zaqen mamre*) by analogy, for concerning the false prophet there came the word *speak*, His saying *but the prophet that shall presume to speak a word* (Deuteronomy 18:20), and concerning the rebellious elder He said *if a matter (davar) be too hard for thee* (Deuteronomy 17:8); so just as the rebellious elder is [tried] by the Great Court, as the text states regarding him *then shalt thou arise and get thee up* (Deuteronomy 17:8), so too the false prophet.
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As for the High Priest (*kohen gadol*), [this is derived] from His saying *every great matter they shall bring unto thee* (Exodus 18:22), meaning the matter of the great man; and with us there is none "great" save the High Priest, as He said *and the high priest* (Numbers 35:25). As for the discretionary war (*milḥemet ha-reshut*), we learn it from what David used to do, for he would not go out to a discretionary war except after taking the counsel of the Great Sanhedrin, according to what is well known to us of his conduct, peace be upon him.
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The discretionary war is the war against Ammon, Moab, Ishmael, and the like. The obligatory war (*milḥemet mitzvah*) is the war against Amalek and the seven nations only.
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And *they do not add to the city*: that is, additions are not made to Jerusalem—for [this would mean] elevating places that are at one rank of sanctity to a rank of sanctity higher than it, since the courtyards (*ʿazarot*) are of greater sanctity than the rest of Jerusalem, and Jerusalem is of greater sanctity than the rest of the Land of Syria, as is explained at the beginning of [tractate] Toharot. And no [new] sanctity can be brought into being save by the Great Court, on account of God's word to Moses, *according to all that I show thee, the pattern of the tabernacle and the pattern of all its vessels, even so shall ye make it* (Exodus 25:9)—the command was to him and to his court.
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And the Sanhedrins for the tribes were instituted by Moses and his court, on account of His saying *moreover thou shalt provide out of all the people* (Exodus 18:21). The ground for the apostate city (*ʿir ha-niddaḥat*) and a tribe that has been led astray being one [is the same]: that none is put to death *within every gate* except individuals.
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And *border* (*sefar*) is the place adjacent to the enemy—the Targum of *the haven of the seas* (Genesis 49:13) is *upon the border of the seas (sefar yamaya)*. The ground for this [prohibition of destroying a border city] is that if the extremities of the land are devastated, the gentiles enter through them and lay waste the Land of Israel.
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For the meaning of his saying *they do not act* is not that they do not slay its inhabitants; rather its meaning is that the full ordinance of the apostate city is not carried out upon it—namely His saying *and it shall be a heap for ever* (Deuteronomy 13:17). And this prohibition against laying waste three cities applies only to one court and to one locale—that is, [cities] near one another.
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Mishnah 6
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Rabbi Yehudah does not count Moses our teacher within the body of the Sanhedrin, for he holds that God's word to him, *and they shall bear [the burden] with thee* (Numbers 11:17), does not mean "they shall judge with thee" but rather "they shall serve as deputies for thee." The Sages, however, hold that its meaning [is "they shall judge with thee"]...