Aligned sentence by sentence
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[The transmission continued] until the era reached the Men of the Great Assembly — namely, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, Azariah, Ezra the Scribe, Nehemiah son of Hacaliah, Mordecai, and Zerubbabel son of Shealtiel — and
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added to these prophets was the full complement of one hundred and twenty elders, drawn from "the craftsmen and the smiths" and their like. They too engaged in the study of the Law, just as those before them had done, and they enacted decrees and instituted ordinances.
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The last man of that pure company was the first of the Sages mentioned in the Mishnah, namely Shimon HaTzaddik; he was High Priest in that period.
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When the era after them reached our holy master—peace be upon him—he was the singular man of his age and the unique figure of his time. He was a man in whom God had gathered such virtues and qualities that he merited from his contemporaries the title Rabbenu HaKadosh ("our holy master"); his name was Yehuda.
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In learning and in eminence of station he reached the very summit, as they said: "From the days of Moses until Rebbi we never found Torah and greatness together in one place" (BT Gittin 59a). And in piety, humility, and renunciation of pleasures he reached the very summit, as they likewise said: "When Rebbi died, humility and fear of sin ceased" (M. Sotah 9:15).
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He was the most eloquent of men and the most fluent in the Hebrew tongue, so much so that the Sages—peace be upon them—would derive the explanation of obscure scriptural words from the speech of his servants and household staff, a thing well known in the Talmud (BT Rosh Hashanah 26b; Megillah 18a).
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In wealth and breadth of circumstance he reached a degree of which it was said: "The stable-master of Rebbi was wealthier than King Shapur" (BT Bava Metzia 85a).
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He was generous toward the people of learning and study; he "spread Torah throughout Israel"; and he gathered together the traditions, the dicta, and the recorded disagreements transmitted from the days of Moses our Teacher down to his own.
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He himself was one of those who transmitted, for he transmitted in the name of Shimon his father, in the name of Gamliel his father, in the name of Shimon his father, in the name of Gamliel his father, in the name of Shimon his father, in the name of Hillel his father, in the name of Shemaiah and Avtalyon his teachers, in the name of Yehuda ben Tabbai and Shimon ben Shatach, in the name of Yehoshua ben Perachiah and Nittai of Arbel, in the name of Yose ben Yoezer and Yose ben Yochanan, in the name of Antigonus of Socho, in the name of Shimon HaTzaddik, in the name of Ezra—for he was of the Men of the Great Assembly—
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and Ezra in the name of Baruch ben Neriah his teacher, and Baruch ben Neriah in the name of Jeremiah. So too Jeremiah, beyond doubt, transmitted from the prophets who preceded him, prophet from prophet, back to the elders who transmitted from Joshua, who [transmitted] from Moses.
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When he had assembled the doctrines and the dicta, he set his hand to the composition of the Mishnah, which comprises the explanation of all the commandments prescribed in the Torah.
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Some of these are traditions handed down from Moses—peace be upon him; some are derivations drawn out by analogical inference concerning which there is no disagreement; and some are derivations in which a disagreement arose between two lines of inference, so that he set them down with their disagreement intact—"so-and-so says thus and so-and-so says thus."
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And even when one [Sage] dissented from a group, he recorded the statement of the individual and the statement of the majority. He did this for highly instructive reasons, which he set out in [the tractate] Eduyot, and which I shall mention—but only after a great principle that I have seen fit to state here.
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This is the matter: one might say, "If the explanations of the Torah are, as we have laid down, transmitted from Moses—as follows from their saying, 'The whole of the Torah, its general rules, its particulars, and its fine points, were spoken at Sinai' (BT Berakhot 5a)—then what are those isolated rulings of which they say that they are a 'law given to Moses at Sinai'?"
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This is a principle you ought to grasp. The point is that the explanations transmitted from Moses admit of no disagreement whatsoever, for to this day we have not found any disagreement arising in any era from Moses to Rav Ashi among any of the Sages—where one of them would say that whoever destroys a person's eye has his own eye destroyed, in accordance with God's word "an eye for an eye" (Exod 21:24), while another would say that he is liable only for monetary compensation.
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Nor have we found any disagreement concerning God's word "the fruit of a goodly tree" (Lev 23:40)—with one saying it is the etrog (citron) and another saying it is the quince or the pomegranate or the like. Nor have we found any disagreement that "the branches of a thick tree" (Lev 23:40) means the myrtle; nor any disagreement that His word "and you shall cut off her hand" (Deut 25:12) means monetary compensation; nor concerning His word "the daughter of a priest, when she profanes herself by playing the whore, she profanes her father" (Lev 21:9)—that she is to be burned—any disagreement that this penalty is not carried out against her unless she was a married woman.
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So too the Most High's penalty concerning a [betrothed maiden] for whom no signs of virginity are found, that she is to be stoned: we have not heard, from Moses until now, anyone dissenting that this applies only if she was a married [i.e., betrothed] woman and witnesses established against her that she committed adultery after the betrothal, with [valid] witnesses and after due warning.
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Whatever runs in this manner throughout all the commandments admits of no disagreement, for they are all explanations transmitted from Moses; and it is of these and their like that they said, "Its general rules and its particulars were spoken at Sinai."
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Yet even though these explanations are transmitted and admit of no disagreement, it belongs to the wisdom of the revealed text that these very explanations can be derived from it by various methods of inference, support, allusion, and hint occurring in the text.
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So when you see them in the Talmud disputing and disagreeing over the course of an inquiry, and adducing proof for one of these explanations or the like—as in their discussion of His word "the fruit of a goodly tree," wondering whether it is the pomegranate, the quince, or some other, until they adduced proof from the words "the fruit of a tree," saying, "a tree the taste of whose wood and whose fruit are the same"; another said, "fruit that abides [hadar] on its tree from year to year"; and another said, "fruit that grows beside all waters" (BT Sukkah 35a)—
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this does not mean that the matter was in genuine doubt for them, such that they required these proofs. Rather, we have, without question, from Joshua down to ourselves, that the etrog was taken together with the lulav every year, and there was no disagreement about it; they were merely searching for the allusion occurring in the text to this transmitted explanation.
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Such likewise is their adducing of proof for the myrtle; their adducing of proof that retaliation [for bodily injury] by way of damages is what is incurred by the absence of one of the victim's limbs; and their adducing of proof concerning the priest's daughter mentioned there, that she is a married woman. Everything resembling this runs upon this same principle.
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This is the meaning of their phrase "its general rules and its particulars": namely, that the things you see us deriving by the rule-and-particular method, and likewise by the rest of the thirteen hermeneutical principles, are transmitted from Moses at Sinai.
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Yet even though they are transmitted from Moses, they do not say of them "a law given to Moses at Sinai," for we do not say "'the fruit of a goodly tree' is the etrog—a law given to Moses at Sinai," or "one who injures his fellow pays money—a law given to Moses at Sinai," since it is already established with us that the explanations are all from Moses and that each has, as we said, an allusion in the text or is derivable by some mode of inference.
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But any case that has no allusion in the text, no connection [to it], and cannot be derived by inference—of those alone do they say "a law given to Moses at Sinai."
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This is why, when we said that the measures [for prohibited foods] are a "law given to Moses at Sinai," we raised an objection to this and said: "How can you call it a 'law given to Moses at Sinai' when you see the measures alluded to in a verse, in His word 'a land of wheat and barley' etc. (Deut 8:8)?"
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And the answer to this was that it is a "law given to Moses at Sinai" and has no source from which it may be derived by inference, nor any allusion to it anywhere in the Torah; rather, it was merely attached to that verse as a kind of mnemonic sign, so that you might guard it and remember it, but this was not the intent of the text.
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This is the meaning of their phrase "a mere asmakhta" wherever they mention it.
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Here I shall list for you most of the rulings of which they said "a law given to Moses at Sinai"—indeed, perhaps all of them—so that the soundness of what I told you will become clear: that not one of them was derived by inference, and that none can be attached to a verse except by way of asmakhta, as we explained; nor have we ever found them engaging in study about any of them or adducing any proof for it.
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Rather, it was received from Moses just as God commanded him.
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They are these: half a log of oil for the thanksgiving offering, a quarter [log] of oil for the nazirite, and the eleven days that fall between one menstrual period and the next—a law given to Moses at Sinai. "Extension," "joining," and "the bent wall"—a law given to Moses at Sinai. The measures, the partitions, and the divisions—a law given to Moses at Sinai. The willow-branch and the water libation—a law given to Moses at Sinai.
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Phylacteries upon parchment (kelaf), the mezuzah upon duksustos, and Torah scrolls upon gevil—a law given to Moses at Sinai. The shin of the phylacteries, the knot of the phylacteries, the black straps, the square shape of the phylacteries, and the passage-loop of the phylacteries—a law given to Moses at Sinai.
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That [the phylacteries] are wrapped in their own hair and sewn with their own sinews—a law given to Moses at Sinai. That a Torah scroll is written in ink and on ruled lines—a law given to Moses at Sinai.
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That intercourse with a girl under three years of age is not [legally] intercourse—a law given to Moses at Sinai. One who plants his field with two kinds of wheat: if he makes one threshing-floor of them he gives a single corner-gift (peah), if two threshing-floors he gives two corner-gifts—a law given to Moses at Sinai.
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Garden seeds that are not eaten combine [to the threshold of] one twenty-fourth of what falls in a beit se'ah—a law given to Moses at Sinai. Ten saplings scattered within a beit se'ah—the whole beit se'ah may be plowed for their sake [in the sabbatical year]—a law given to Moses at Sinai.
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A round cake of pressed figs part of which became unclean—one separates terumah from the clean part within it—a law given to Moses at Sinai. The [law of] orlah outside the Land [of Israel]—a law given to Moses at Sinai. That the reader sees from where the children read—a law given to Moses at Sinai.
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The woman who girds herself with an apron, whether in front or behind—a law given to Moses at Sinai. Regarding wine, they permitted mixing the harsh with the soft—a law given to Moses at Sinai. Ammon and Moab give the tithe of the poor in the sabbatical year—a law given to Moses at Sinai.
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Whenever one of these laws comes up in what lies ahead of us in the commentary on the Mishnah, I shall make it clear in its place, with God's help.
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By the principles we have set forth, the categories of rulings established in the Law turn out to be five.
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The first category: the explanations transmitted from Moses, to which there is an allusion in the text, or which can be derived by inference. In these there is never any disagreement; rather, once a person says "I have a tradition that thus-and-so," the discussion is settled.
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The second category: the rulings of which it was said that they are a "law given to Moses at Sinai," for which there is no supporting argument, as we mentioned. These too admit of no disagreement.
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The third category: the rulings derived by methods of inference, in which disagreement does arise, as we mentioned; here a decision is reached according to the doctrine of the majority, as we laid down. This applies when the two lines of reasoning are of equal weight; and it is for this reason that they say, "If it is a tradition, we accept it; but if it is a [matter of] reasoning, there is a reply" (BT Pesachim 66a).
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Disagreement and disputation arise only in matters for which no tradition has been heard. You find them throughout the entire Talmud inquiring into the modes of inference on account of which a disagreement arose between those who disputed; so they ask, "On what do they disagree?" or "What is the reasoning of Rabbi So-and-so?" or "What is [the difference] between them?" For sometimes they pursue this theme in certain places and report the cause of the disagreement, saying that So-and-so based himself on such-and-such an argument and So-and-so on such-and-such, and the like.
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As for the supposition of one who supposes that the rulings under dispute are likewise transmitted from Moses, and that the disagreement arose only through error in the traditions or through forgetting—so that one [Sage] transmitted the truth and the other erred in his transmission, or forgot, or did not hear from his teacher all that he ought to have heard—and who adduces support for this from their saying, "When the disciples of Shammai and Hillel multiplied who had not served [their masters] sufficiently, disagreement multiplied in Israel and the Torah became as two Torahs" (BT Sotah 47b; Sanhedrin 88b)
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—this, God knows, is a vile and exceedingly repugnant thing to say. It is unverified, undisciplined talk, ungrounded in principles, and it casts aspersion on the very men through whom the Law was conveyed to us; the whole of it is null. What drove [those who hold] this corrupt belief is the slightness of their grasp of the words of the Sages found in the Talmud; for they found that the explanation is transmitted from Moses—which is correct, as we laid down—but they failed to distinguish between the transmitted principles and the conclusions derived [from them].
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As for you—however much you may doubt about anything, do not doubt that the disagreement of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel in their statement that "we sweep the house and afterward wash the hands," or "we wash the hands and afterward sweep the house" (BT Berakhot 52b), involves no statement transmitted from Moses, nor heard at Sinai by either side. Rather, the cause of their disagreement is what has been mentioned: one of them holds that handling [food] by an am ha'aretz renders it forbidden, while the other permits it. And so it is with everything resembling these disagreements, which are branches of branches of branches.
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As for their saying, "When the disciples of Shammai and Hillel multiplied who had not served sufficiently, disagreement multiplied in Israel"—the meaning of this is perfectly clear. For when two persons are equal in understanding, in reasoning power, and in knowledge of the principles from which derivations are made, no disagreement at all arises between them in what they derive by inference; or if it does, it is slight—just as we never find any disagreement between Shammai and Hillel except in a handful of laws, because the inferential reasoning of both, in everything they derived by inference, was very nearly the same, and the principles taken as established by the one were like those taken as established by the other.
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But when the [intensity of] study of their disciples diminished, and their inferential reasoning grew weaker relative to that of Hillel and Shammai their teachers, disagreement arose among them in disputation over many matters—since each one's inference followed the measure of his own intellect and the principles at his disposal.
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In all of this they are not to be blamed; for we do not require of two persons engaged in disputation that they dispute with the intellect of Joshua and Phinehas, nor are we ourselves in any doubt about what they disagreed over merely because they are not the equals of Shammai and Hillel or their superiors—for God, exalted and mighty, did not impose that upon us as a duty. He charged us only with hearing [the Law] from the Sages of learning, of whatever era they may be, as He said: "and you shall come to the judge who shall be in those days, and you shall inquire" (Deut 17:9).
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It is in this manner that disagreement arose—not that they erred in the traditions, with one transmitting the truth and the other falsehood. How clear this matter is to one who reflects on it, and how great is this principle in the Law!
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The fourth category: the rulings enacted by the prophets and the Sages in each and every era by way of fencing and safeguarding the Law. These are what God commanded should be done, in a general statement, namely His word "and you shall keep My charge" (Lev 18:30), and the received [interpretation] came: "make a safeguard for My charge" (BT Yevamot 21a). These are what the Sages call decrees (gezerot). Disagreement may also arise within them, in that one person holds that such-and-such should be forbidden on account of such-and-such, while another does not. The Talmud frequently has "Rabbi So-and-so decreed on account of this-and-that, and Rabbi So-and-so did not decree"; this too is one of the causes of disagreement.
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Do you not see that fowl in milk is a rabbinic decree, to keep one far from transgression? For the Torah forbade only the flesh of a clean domestic animal [cooked in milk]; the Sages forbade fowl, as a precaution distancing one from the forbidden thing. Yet there are those who do not adopt this decree, for Rabbi Yose the Galilean would permit eating fowl in milk, and the people of his town all ate it, as is well known in the Talmud (BT Shabbat 130a).
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When agreement is reached upon any of these decrees, there is no way to transgress it whatsoever. And once its prohibition has become widespread in Israel, there is no way to oppose that decree—even the prophets could not annul it; the Talmud states explicitly that Elijah could not annul a single one of the eighteen matters that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel decreed, and they gave the reason, saying, "because their prohibition has spread throughout all Israel" (BT Avodah Zarah 36a).
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The fifth category: the rulings enacted by way of legal reasoning and convention concerning matters that arise among people—matters that involve neither addition to nor subtraction from the Law—or matters that serve the welfare of the people in affairs touching the Law. These are what the Sages call ordinances (takkanot) and customs (minhagot). It is forbidden to transgress them in any way, since the whole community has agreed upon them; and Solomon forbade transgressing them, saying, "and whoever breaches a fence, a serpent shall bite him" (Eccl 10:8).
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These ordinances are very numerous, recorded in the Talmud and the Mishnah—some concerning the law of the forbidden and the permitted, some concerning property matters, and some being ordinances enacted by the prophets, such as the ordinances of Moses, Joshua, and Ezra, as they said: "Moses instituted for Israel that they should ask and expound the laws of Passover on Passover" etc. (BT Megillah 32a; Pesachim 6a), and "Moses instituted the [blessing] 'who sustains' at the time the manna came down" (BT Berakhot 48b). As for the ordinances of Joshua and Ezra, they are numerous.
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Some are ordinances ascribed to individual Sages, as when they say, "Hillel instituted the prozbul" (M. Sheviit 10:3), "Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted," "Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai instituted"—and the Talmud often has "Rabbi So-and-so instituted, Rabbi So-and-so instituted." And some are ordinances ascribed to the collective body, as when they say, "in Usha they instituted," or "the Sages instituted," or "an ordinance of the Sages," and much of this kind.
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Thus the totality of the rulings recorded in the Mishnah divide into these five categories: among them are explanations transmitted from Moses that have an allusion in the text, or upon which an inference can be made; among them are laws given to Moses at Sinai; among them is what was derived by inference and is subject to disagreement; among them are decrees; and among them are ordinances.
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As for the reason for [Rebbi's] recording the disagreement that arose between the two lines of inference concerning matters subject to disagreement, we shall describe it. The point is that, had he recorded [only] established dicta admitting of no disagreement and discarded the statement of the one whose doctrine is not followed in practice, then in the era after him there would come someone who had received the opposite of the very thing that is followed in practice—either from the person who dissented on that doctrine, or [someone reasoning] by his own reasoning—and a doubt would fall into our minds, and we would say: "How can this man, an honest fellow, transmit that such-and-such a thing is forbidden, when you see the Mishnah explicitly declaring it permitted?"—or the reverse.
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But when the [various] doctrines are known to us, this defect is sealed off: when the transmitter says, "I have heard that such-and-such is forbidden," we say to him, "You speak truly, but that is the doctrine of So-and-so, and the majority dissents from it"—or "So-and-so dissents from it, and the practice follows the doctrine of the one dissented from"—either because his inference is sounder, or because we have found another statement that supports it.
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As for [Rebbi's] recording of [both] an individual's view and the majority's view: this is because the law may sometimes follow the individual, so he wished to teach you that if the inference is plain, even an individual's [view] is to be accepted, even though the majority dissents from it.
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As for his recording a person's doctrine followed by that person's retraction from that doctrine—as in his saying, "Beit Shammai say thus and Beit Hillel say thus, and Beit Hillel retracted to rule in accordance with the words of Beit Shammai"—
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this is to teach you the pursuit of truth and the preference for honesty. For these great figures, the virtuous, the elect, the men of vast learning and sound minds, when they saw that the statement of those who dissented from them was sounder and stronger in reasoning than their own, conceded and retracted to their doctrine.
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How much more fitting and proper, then, is it for the rest of mankind, when they see the truth on their opponent's side, to be led by it and not to be obstinate. This is God's word, "justice, justice shall you pursue" (Deut 16:20),
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and concerning this the Sages say, "Be one who acknowledges the truth" (cf. M. Avot)—meaning that even if you are able to extricate yourself by dialectical arguments, once you know that your fellow's statement is true and that your case against it is [only apparently] strong owing to its weakness or to your capacity for sophistry [that] obscures the truth, return to his statement and abandon the dispute.
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When [Rebbi] resolved to compose this corpus upon this design, he saw fit to divide it into divisions, and so he made it six parts.
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The first part: the commandments incumbent upon the produce of the earth, such as the diverse kinds (kilayim), the sabbatical year, the orlah, the heave-offerings (terumot), the tithes (ma'aserot), and the rest of the [agricultural] dues.
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The second part: the seasons, the festivals, and their requirements, the variation of their laws, and what is forbidden, recommended, and permitted in them, together with whatever rulings and laws may suitably be attached to each of their sections.
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The third part: marriages, and the detailing of the rulings that arise between men and women, such as levirate marriage (yibbum), the release [from it] (chalitzah), the marriage contract (ketubah), betrothal (kiddushin), and bills of divorce (gittin), and what is fitting to be said in each of its sections.
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The fourth part: the rulings and disputes that arise among people in transactions, sales, partnership in liability, and the like.
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The fifth part: the sacrifices, with the variety of their laws and the multitude of their kinds. The sixth part: the purities and their opposites.
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He called each of these parts a seder ("order"). He named the first part Seder Zeraim; the second, Seder Mo'ed; the third, Seder Nashim; the fourth, Seder Nezikin; the fifth, Seder Kodashim; and the sixth, Seder Tohorot.
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He began with Seder Zeraim because its subject concerns commandments specific to the produce of the earth, and the produce of the earth is the nourishment of every living being; for were a human being not to live by partaking of nourishment, no form of divine service would be possible for him. He therefore placed the discussion of the commandments specific to the produce of the earth first.
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He then followed this with Seder Mo'ed, because such is the order of the text, in God's word, "Six years you shall sow your land and gather in its produce, but the seventh year you shall let it rest and lie fallow" etc. (Exod 23:10–11), and after it, "Six days you shall do your work" (Exod 23:12), "Three times a year you shall hold a feast for Me" (Exod 23:14).
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He then saw fit to place the laws of women before the rest of the disputes, following the sequence of the text, for thus God did: "And if a man sells his daughter" etc. (Exod 21:7), "And if men strive and they hurt" etc. (Exod 21:22), and after it, "And if an ox gores" (Exod 21:28); so he placed Seder Nashim before Nezikin.
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The book of Va'eleh Shemot [Exodus] comprises these four themes—I mean the theme of Seder Zeraim, Seder Mo'ed, Seder Nashim, and Seder Nezikin.
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He then moved from Eleh Shemot to the book of Vayikra [Leviticus], following the order of the revelation, placing Seder Kodashim after Seder Nezikin, and after it Seder Tohorot—for such is the order of the text: he set the law concerning the sacrifices before the law concerning impurities and purities, since [the laws of] purities begin only from "And it came to pass on the eighth day" (Lev 9:1).
When he had assembled these six classes that encompass [the commandments] …