Aligned sentence by sentence
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The king may keep only enough cavalry horses to mount his troops, and he may likewise multiply horses in his encampment so as to strike terror into the enemy. What God forbade him was rather that he keep idle horses standing in stables, kept ready for him to ride on some day, or to be led before him in the manner of the kings of the nations. Indeed, he may keep no more than a single horse, for him to ride upon like any other person. As for *afsanya*, it means the army and the soldiery. Nor is he forbidden to amass wealth, save for himself—that is, the wealth that accrues to him lawfully from his own lands, his commerce, and his entitlements; whereas the public treasuries set aside for the welfare of Israel, the Law commands him to enlarge.
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He is also to write two complete Torah scrolls: one is to remain with him always and never leave his side, as mentioned here, and the second is to be kept in his storehouses. And the law is neither according to Rabbi Yehudah nor according to Rabbi Shimon.
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Mishnah 6
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*When he gets his hair cut*—that is, when he trims the hair of his head. The remainder of the discussion is clear.
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Mishnah 1
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The basis of the Sages' ruling—that it is the two judges who select the third—is that the judge whom one of the two litigants chose looks into the merits of that litigant's case (his *zekhut*), and likewise the second judge looks into the merits of the second litigant who chose him, while the third holds the balance between them and has no inclination toward either litigant, since neither of them chose him.
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The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages is not over expert judges (*mumḥin*), but over judges who are not experts; for Rabbi Meir holds that, since they are not experts, a litigant may impugn their ruling, whereas the Sages hold that, since they are fit (*kesherim*) and were chosen in the manner we described, he cannot disqualify his own judges. The meaning of the Sages' phrase "if they were fit or expert" is merely explanatory; it is as though they said: if they were fit, they are as good as experts, whom one cannot disqualify.
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The upshot of the entire Talmudic discussion on this matter is what I shall now set out for you. When the litigants have agreed to the adjudication of certain persons and have accepted them upon themselves, then even if those persons are not scholars—that is, even if they are laymen (*hedyotot*)—their ruling stands binding upon the litigants, unless they erred in the ruling, in which case the matter is subject to reversal.
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But if the litigants did not choose those judges, nor appoint them over themselves—rather these came forward of their own accord to adjudicate people's cases, or a ruler appointed them, or some of the elders of a community appointed them (rather than those two litigants)—then, if they are experts, their judgments are valid law and their ruling binding, provided they did not err, as we said.
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The meaning of "expert" (*mumḥe*) is that they be among the people of learning in the science of the Law, conversant with the texts laid down in it, capable of analogical reasoning and inference, as the Talmud explained in their saying "such as I, who have learned and can reason" (*ki-gon ana de-gamirna u-sevirna*)—meaning: I have memorized the texts, and I know how to interpret, to reason by analogy, and to grasp the underlying senses.
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A person of this description, even on his own, may judge, even though he has not received authorization (*reshuta*) from the Exilarch—provided it be widely known among the people that he is so, which is the meaning of their phrase "an expert recognized by the public" (*mumḥe la-rabbim*).
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But one who is not an expert—his judgment is no judgment, even if he ruled in accordance with the truth, and even if he held authorization from the Exilarch; for the authorization avails only an expert, as is explained in the Talmud. This expert who has not received authorization, however, has no power to compel the litigants to be judged before him; yet whoever is judged by him is bound by his ruling.
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As for the expert who has received authorization from the Exilarch, he may judge the litigants whether one of them wishes it or not, and no one anywhere on earth can escape his ruling. And if this expert received authorization from the court of the Land of Israel—that is, from the head of the academy (*rosh yeshivah*)—he too may judge the litigants even against their will, but in the Land of Israel only. This, then, is the whole sum of the matter.
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As for his further statement, "this one disqualifies the witnesses of that one, and that one disqualifies the witnesses of this one"—his dispute with the Sages is not over the case of one who brought two witnesses to testify on his behalf in some matter, whom his opponent then seeks to disqualify, such that the opponent is heeded; for it is plain that the opponent is not heeded unless he brings proof that they are kinsmen or otherwise unfit.
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Rather, Rabbi Meir disputes the Sages in the following case: Reuven claimed against Shimon that he had money owing to him, and Reuven brought two witnesses who testified against Shimon to that effect; then afterward he brought two further witnesses who likewise testified to the same matter as the first two. If Shimon now alleges, "these four witnesses are all unfit," Rabbi Meir holds that his claim is heeded, and Reuven is told: establish that they are fit—for you brought witnesses upon witnesses testifying to one and the same matter only because you knew that among them are some unfit to testify, and since we cannot tell which are the unfit, the first pair or the second, it is incumbent upon you to establish the validity of one pair.
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But the Sages say: the bringing of witnesses upon witnesses gives us no grounds for suspicion, for he did this not because any of them is unfit, but in order to strengthen his case and make known that it is a matter attested by many; and Shimon is not heeded unless he establishes the unfitness. And the law is according to the Sages in all this discussion.
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Mishnah 2
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The dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Sages concerns retraction after the verdict (*gezar din*). The verdict is the point after the judge has accepted the testimony and pronounces, "So-and-so, you are acquitted; so-and-so, you are liable." Before that, a litigant may retract, even according to the Sages.
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But once the act of acquisition (*qinyan*) has been performed—that is, that he has accepted So-and-so's testimony against him, or So-and-so's ruling—he can no longer retract, for they said, "after the qinyan there is nothing."
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And there is no difference between his saying to him, "Make oath to me by your life, and we will pay you what you have claimed," and his saying, "Make oath to me by your life, and I will be quit of what I have claimed against you": once the judge has administered the oath to him—as in the case where the litigant said this—or once the act of acquisition has been performed whereby he agreed to abide by the oath, he can no longer retract, since the law is according to the Sages. The meaning of "make oath to me" (*dor li*) is "let him vow to me by your life," from the term *neder* (vow).
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Mishnah 3
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Since he had said earlier "if one of them turns out to be a kinsman or unfit," he now proceeds to explain who is unfit and who is a kinsman. He says: *the dice-player* (*mesaḥeq be-qubya*) is one who plays at backgammon, chess, and the like, with the stipulation of a weight of silver against whoever does or does not perform such-and-such according to the rules of that game. This is forbidden because he occupies himself with an occupation of no benefit to the settlement of the world.
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And it is a foundation of our Law that a man ought not to occupy himself in this world save with one of two things: either with a branch of knowledge by which he perfects himself, or with an occupation that sustains the world's continuance, such as the crafts and trades; and one ought to lessen the latter and increase the former, as they said, "Have little business and be occupied with Torah" (Avot 4:10). Let me return to the purpose of the *halakhah*.
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The one who lends at interest (*malveh be-ribbit*) (*malveh be-ribbit*; note that Rambam stresses both lender and borrower are disqualified.)—both the one who takes it and the one who pays it, both are unfit. The pigeon-flyers (*mafriḥei yonim*) take money that is not theirs, for they lure the males with females and the females with males, as is well known among those who do this. Likewise the traffickers in the produce of the Sabbatical year (*soḥarei shevi'it*) take money that is not theirs to trade with.
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As for the interpretation of Rabbi Shimon's words, what I tell you is this: in the earliest period they held that "gatherers of Sabbatical produce" (*osfei shevi'it*) were unfit and "traffickers in Sabbatical produce" were unfit. But when the gentiles overran the land, oppressed Israel, and imposed upon them levies of provisions every year, the people resumed contracting for the cultivation of the Sabbatical year—that is, the produce that grows in that year—and making of it the provision-levy for the kings. At that point they said that the gatherers of Sabbatical produce are fit, since they do not gather for themselves, and the traffickers in Sabbatical produce alone remain the unfit ones. This is the meaning of his saying, "they reverted to calling them traffickers in Sabbatical produce"—that is, they returned to ruling that none is unfit save the trafficker in Sabbatical produce.
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Beware of supposing that these alone are the witnesses disqualified from testimony; rather they are many, and to set them all out would be lengthy. But grasp them through two principles that cover most of them—indeed, scarcely any falls outside these two principles except isolated cases. The first is that anyone who commits a transgression incurring lashes (*malqut*) is thereby disqualified for testimony, even if there is no aspect of money in that transgression at all—such as one who eats meat with milk, or carrion, or who shaves off the temple-locks (*pe'ah*), or wears mixed fabric (*sha'atnez*), and the like.
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For the true Scripture called everyone liable to lashes "wicked" (*rasha*), as it says, "if the wicked man deserves to be beaten" (Deut. 25:2); and it forbade accepting the testimony of a wicked man, as it says, "Put not your hand with the wicked to be a witness" (Exod. 23:1), the received interpretation of which is "set not a wicked man as a witness." Yet when he has been flogged, he reverts to being fit for testimony, as we said, on the basis of "and your brother be degraded" (Deut. 25:3)—"once he has been flogged, he is your brother again." This is the one principle.
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The second principle is that anyone who takes money unlawfully, even if he does not incur lashes, is disqualified for testimony—such as the thief, the robber, and the one who lends at interest. And it is on the grounds of taking money unlawfully that we likewise classed the pigeon-flyers, the extortioners (*ḥamsanin*), the [communal] tax-collectors (*gabba'in*), the customs-farmers (*mokhesin*), the herdsmen (*ro'im*), and those who eat the charity of gentiles, as disqualified for testimony.
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For the tax-collectors sometimes take for themselves, and likewise the customs-farmers; the herdsmen graze their flocks on people's lands; and the charity of gentiles is not meant for Israel, and consuming it is notorious where there is no compelling need. These, however, are disqualified for testimony by rabbinic decree; therefore their unfitness does not take effect, nor is their testimony rejected, until after public proclamation (*hakhrazah*) and notice to the people that they are unfit—whereas those disqualified for testimony by Torah law require no proclamation.
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As for the conspiring witness (*ed zomem*), he is disqualified for testimony, since he is sometimes liable to lashes and sometimes liable to a financial penalty, as is explained in the third chapter of Ketubot. And we need not discuss those liable to death, that they are unfit, since the designation "wicked" is applied to them too, as it says, "who is wicked, deserving death" (Num. 35:31).
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The repentance of this second category, and their being readmitted to giving testimony, consists in their restoring to its rightful owner what they took unlawfully—the very object itself, if possible—and then forsaking those practices altogether, even the lawful aspect of them.
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For example: let the one who took interest restore what he took and not engage in lending at interest at all, even with gentiles, where it is permitted; and likewise the chess-player, let him not play even without silver stakes; and the pigeon-flyer, let him not occupy himself with them even in open country where there is no one to be robbed; and so reckon accordingly.
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So when such repentance becomes known of one of them, and the witnesses attest that it was possible for him to do as he used to do by way of wrongdoing and he refrained from doing so on account of his repentance, then he has reverted to being fit. And the law is according to Rabbi Yehudah.
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Mishnah 4
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*His father-in-law* (*ḥamiv*)—the father of his wife. *His brother-in-law* (*gisso*)—the husband of her sister. *His son-in-law* (*ḥatno*)—the husband of his daughter. So his statement "they and their sons and their sons-in-law" means the husbands of their daughters, for the husband of a man's daughter is like his daughter, since "the husband is as his wife" (*ha-ba'al ke-ishto*); thus the ruling concerning a man's son and concerning his son-in-law in respect of testimony is one and the same.
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What we said—that the son of his brother-in-law and his son-in-law (that is, the son-in-law of his brother-in-law) is a kinsman—applies when that son or daughter is from his wife's sister; but the son of his brother-in-law or his son-in-law from another woman, not his wife's sister, is not related to him. And the stepson (*ḥorego*) is the son of his wife by another man—he alone is a kinsman; but the son of his stepson and the son-in-law of his stepson are not. Yet the wife of his stepson he may not testify for, since she is as her husband.
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The principle that will make clear to you which kinsman is permitted and which kinsman is forbidden in testimony is what I shall set out. Persons issuing from a single root in the first generation of issue—namely brothers—are called "first to first" (*rishon be-rishon*), and their testimony for one another is not permitted, one against the other. The second tier—such as the sons of paternal uncles among themselves, or the sons of maternal aunts among themselves, or the sons of a maternal uncle together with the sons of a paternal aunt among themselves—are called "second to second" (*sheni be-sheni*), and their testimony for one another is likewise not permitted. The third tier—namely a man's grandchildren together with the grandchildren of his brother or sister—are called "third to third" (*shelishi be-shelishi*), and their testimony for one another is permitted.
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Testimony of "third to first" is also permitted—as the testimony of the paternal uncle concerning his brother's grandson, or together with him, and likewise the testimony of the brother's grandson concerning him—and all the more so, and more fittingly, is the testimony of "third to second" permitted. A man stands in the place of his wife, and his wife in his place, for the purpose of testimony. For example: a man stands to his sister's husband as "first to first," since "the husband is as his wife"; and likewise he stands to his brother's wife as "first to first," since "the wife is as her husband."
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And a father and his son are "first to first"; the reason it [the Mishnah] does not enumerate this and say "his father" is that this is explicit Scripture. The prohibition of a kinsman's testimony hinges only on God's prohibition that a father testify against his son or a son against his father, in the verse "fathers shall not be put to death for the children" (Deut. 24:16)—that is, they shall not be put to death on the strength of one another's testimony.
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And his statement "and anyone fit to inherit from him" is not part of the wording of the first Mishnah, but is the completion of Rabbi Akiva's Mishnah. "He was a kinsman and then ceased to be" refers to where his wife—who created the kinship between him and another tier—dies or he divorces her. And the law is neither according to the first Mishnah nor according to Rabbi Yehudah.
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Mishnah 5
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*His groomsman* (*shoshbino*)—this is his boon-companion, like the companions taken on during the wedding days, who are called *shoshbinin*. And the law is not according to Rabbi Yehudah; rather, a friend and an enemy are both fit for testimony, but unfit for judging—that is, one may not sit in judgment either for the one he loves or over the one he hates: "let him not judge a case, neither for one he loves nor for one he hates."
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All the narratives in the Talmud reinforce this principle, strengthen it, and urge it; and one ought not to make light of all that through imaginings that have no reality.
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Mishnah 6
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*They admonish them* (*ma'imin*)—they put fear into them, magnify before them the gravity of testimony, and explain to them what disgrace and what severity of punishment false testimony brings upon the one who gives it. The meaning of "he confessed to him in our presence" is that he said to us, "Be witnesses against me that I owe so-and-so a *maneh*," or words to that effect, or that he said to us by way of confession and formal deposition of testimony. But if he confessed in their presence merely in the course of conversation and did not say to them "be witnesses against me," that is the case of "he told me that he owes him"—which testimony is of no avail.
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"The judges add"—that is, they add two, so that they become five; and if this same situation recurs, and two say "acquitted" and two say "liable" and one says "I do not know," or four say "acquitted" or "liable" and one says "I do not know," they add two more; and so it continues until there is some number giving one opinion and a number greater than it giving the contrary opinion.
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Mishnah 7
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*They bring them in* (*makhnisin otan*)—that is, the litigants; for the judges deliberate over the ruling while the litigants are outside their presence, after the judges have heard their pleas. The reason for this is so that favoritism toward one of the litigants not arise, and also so that the losing party not learn who it was that found him liable—so that the judges remain beloved by the people, and no one know who it was that found him liable nor who acquitted him.
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Therefore it was said of one of them who discloses this secret and makes known who acquitted and who found liable: "a tale-bearer reveals secrets" (Prov. 11:13). And the law is according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
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Mishnah 8
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*His undergarment* (*pundato*)—his *miʿraqa*, which is the garment clinging to his body. And the law is not according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, because once a litigant has said "I have no witnesses and no proof"...