Aligned sentence by sentence
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He will not accept any [later evidence] that he might invoke afterward to support his claim, for we say [in such a case] that there is some collusion in this supporting evidence or in these witnesses, since he had [already] stated that he had no supporting evidence whatsoever.
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But if he said, "I have witnesses in such-and-such a city," or, "I have a document there," he is not heard, and rather the verdict proceeds according to what is presently available.
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Then, [if afterward] he produces his witnesses or his document, he overturns the judgment, and a ruling is given for him in accordance with what has [now] become apparent to him—since at the outset of the matter he did not say, "I have no witnesses and no proof." *Chapter Four.*
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Mishnah 1
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His statement that "both monetary cases and [capital cases require] inquiry and examination" is [a requirement] by Torah law; but in order that "the door not be locked before borrowers," they ruled that inquiry and examination need not be carried to completion in monetary cases.
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As for probing [interrogation], no reliance is placed upon it at all in monetary cases—except where there is collusion in that very judgment, as in what they call "a suspect case" (*din meruammeh*).
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The difference between inquiry and examination [on the one hand] and probing [on the other] is that examination and inquiry concern those matters that bear upon the substance of the verdict, such as our asking: How much did he lend him? When did he lend it to him? In what manner did he lend it? And in what place did he lend it—that is, in which town?
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Probing [interrogation], by contrast, is the pursuit of matters that bear no substance [upon the verdict], such as our asking: What garment was the lender, or the borrower, wearing when he took the money? Was either of them seated or standing? Was the money in a silk garment or in a wool garment?—and whatever follows this pattern of inquiries that, being [merely] probing, yield nothing of relevance to the verdict.
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"And by [the mouth of] two for liability"—as when eleven judges say "acquitted" and thirteen judges say "liable," in which case the number of those declaring liability exceeds those declaring acquittal by two, and only then is he put to death.
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Should you ask: How is this possible, when the court consists of only twenty-three, as stated above, so that the convicting judges cannot exceed the acquitting judges by two unless the court were twenty-four?—the answer is this: [the case arises] when eleven say "acquitted," eleven say "liable," and one says "I do not know," for then the judges must be increased by two, as stated above, so that the deliberating [judges] become twenty-four, and among them the increase we mentioned—of the convicting over the acquitting by two—becomes possible.
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To this matter attaches the verse, "Do not follow a multitude to do evil" (Exodus 23:2)—meaning that when the majority [inclines] toward harm, you do not heed them unless there is an additional surplus, namely that those who rule for harm exceed [the others] by two or more.
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"Therefore they do not judge on the eve of the Sabbath"—because the final verdict would fall on the Sabbath, and execution is not possible on the Sabbath, on account of the verse, "You shall kindle no fire throughout your dwellings on the Sabbath day" (Exodus 35:3), which intends [to forbid] even [that] in the session of the court the one liable to burning be burned; and likewise the other [forms of] punishment are not carried out on the Sabbath.
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Mishnah 2
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In capital cases the opinion of the greatest among them is not heard until [the opinions of] the rest of the company [have been heard], for if the greatest among them were to speak first, it would not be possible for the rest to differ with him, on account of the verse, "You shall not respond in a dispute [to incline]" (Exodus 23:2)—where it is written *rav*
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: that is, one whose word is weighty in learning, you may not contradict. For this reason the hearing of his opinion is deferred.
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As for his statement, "All are fit to judge"—this includes even a convert, (JA: *גר* (*ger*). A convert may judge provided his mother is a born Israelite.) provided his mother is of Israel. Likewise a *mamzer* is fit to judge monetary cases.
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Mishnah 3
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*ʿAgulah* [means] a circle.
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And to this attaches R. Yehuda's view that there should be witnesses [recorded] for those who acquit and witnesses for those who convict. But the law is in accordance with the Sages.
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Mishnah 4
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It has already been made clear from what we said in the first chapter of this tractate that before every court of twenty-three there are three rows, and in each row there are likewise twenty-three [persons], arranged first, second, third, and so on to the last, according to their rank in learning.
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Mishnah 5
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*Me'omed* [derives] from preponderance of conjecture and inference …