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Part One · Chapter Fifty-Two — The Five Types of Attributes
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Every subject to which an attribute belongs — such that it is said to be such-and-such — that attribute can only belong to one of these five categories.
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The first category: a thing is described by its definition — as a human being is described as the rational animal. This attribute indicates the essence and reality of the thing; we have explained that it is merely an explanation of a name and nothing more. This type of attribute is denied of God by everyone, since He, exalted be He, has no prior causes that are the cause of His existence and by which He could be defined. It is therefore well-known among all the accomplished speculative thinkers, on account of what they say, that God cannot be defined.
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The second category: a thing is described by a part of its definition — as a human being is described by animality or by rational speech. The meaning of this is entailment: when we say 'every human being is a rational speaker,' the meaning is that everyone in whom humanity exists has rational speech in him. This type of attribute is denied of God, exalted be He, by everyone — for if He had a part of an essence, His essence would be composite, and the impossibility of this category in His case is like the impossibility of the one before it.
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The third category: a thing is described by a matter extraneous to its reality and essence — something that does not constitute the essence and actualize it — and this matter, if it is in it, is then a quality, and quality, as the highest genus, is an accident among the accidents. If an attribute of this category were found in Him, exalted be He, He would be a substrate for accidents — and it is sufficient as a departure from His reality and essence, I mean His being possessed of quality. What is remarkable is that those who assert attributes deny of Him, exalted be He, likening and qualifying — yet what does their saying 'He cannot be qualified' mean, except that He is not possessed of quality? For every attribute that is necessitated of some essence necessarily — either it constitutes the essence, in which case it is the essence itself, or it is a quality of that essence.
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The genera of quality are four, as you know; and I shall give you an example on the path of attribute from each of these genera, to make clear to you the impossibility of this type of attribute existing for God, exalted be He.
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The first example: describing a human being by one of its intellectual or moral dispositions, or by the states that exist in it by virtue of its having a soul — such as saying 'so-and-so is a carpenter,' or 'abstemious,' or 'sick.' There is no difference between saying 'a carpenter' and saying 'learned' or 'wise' — all are states of the soul. Nor is there a difference between saying 'abstemious' and saying 'compassionate,' for every craft, every piece of knowledge, every entrenched character trait is a state of the soul — and all of this is clear to anyone who has practiced the art of logic even a little.
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The second example: describing a thing by a natural power in it, or the absence of a natural power — such as saying 'soft' and 'hard.' There is no difference between saying 'soft' and 'hard' and saying 'strong' and 'weak' — all are natural dispositions.
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The third example: describing a human being by the passional quality and affective states — such as saying 'so-and-so is irascible,' or 'bashful,' or 'fearful,' or 'compassionate,' when the character trait has not become entrenched. And of this same genus is describing a thing by color, taste, smell, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture.
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The fourth example: describing a thing by what pertains to it from the aspect of quantity, insofar as it is a quantity — such as saying 'tall' and 'short,' 'curved' and 'straight,' and the like.
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When you reflect upon all these attributes and what is in their category, you will find them impossible in the case of the Deity — for He is not possessed of quantity, such that quantity-quality could attach to Him as it attaches to what has quantity; nor is He affected and acted upon, such that passional quality could attach to Him; nor does He have dispositions, such that powers and the like could attach to Him; nor is He, exalted be He, possessed of a soul, such that He would have states of soul, so that dispositions like wisdom, modesty, and the like could attach to Him; nor do the things that attach to a souled thing insofar as it has a soul — like health and sickness — apply to Him. It has thus been shown to you that every attribute that falls under the highest genus of quality does not exist in Him, exalted be He.
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These three categories of attributes — those that indicate an essence, or a part of an essence, or a quality present in the essence — their impossibility in His case, exalted be He, has been shown, for they all imply composition, of which we shall demonstrate by proof the impossibility in the case of the Deity.
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The fourth category of attributes: a thing is described by its relation to something else — such as its relation to a time, a place, or another person; for example, describing Zayd as the father of so-and-so, or the associate of so-and-so, or the inhabitant of such-and-such a place, or the one who was in such-and-such a time. This type of attribute does not necessitate any multiplicity or change in the essence of the thing described — for this same Zayd, pointed to, is the associate of ʿAmr, and the father of Bakr, and the client of Khālid, and the companion of Zayd, and the inhabitant of the house that is such-and-such, and the one who was born in such-and-such a year; and these relational meanings are neither his essence nor anything in his essence, as the qualitative attributes are. It seems at first glance that it might be permissible to describe God, exalted be He, by this type of attribute — but upon careful investigation and precise examination it becomes clear that this is impossible.
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That there is no relation between God, exalted be He, and time or place is evident: for time is an accident attached to motion, when one reflects upon motion and notices in it the meaning of priority and posteriority — and by this it becomes multiple, as has been shown in the places devoted to this discipline. Motion is an appurtenance of bodies, and God, exalted be He, is not a body — so there is no relation between Him and time; and likewise there is no relation between Him and place.
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As for the matter of investigation and inquiry — whether there is between Him, exalted be He, and any of His creatures that are substances any real relation by which He might be described: that there is no correlation between Him and any of His creatures is evident at first glance, since among the properties of correlatives is reciprocal convertibility, and He, exalted be He, is a necessary existent while everything besides Him is a possible existent — as will be explained — so there is no correlation. As for whether there might be some relation between them: this is something one might suppose to be valid, but it is not so. For it is impossible to conceive a relation between the intellect and color — even though both of them are encompassed by one existence in our view — so how can one conceive a relation between one who shares with nothing else any meaning encompassing them at all, since existence is predicated of Him, exalted be He, and of anything besides Him, by pure equivocation only? So in reality there is no relation whatsoever between Him and any of His creatures, because a relation can only exist between two things under one proximate species necessarily; and if they are under one genus, there is no relation between them — which is why it is not said that this redness is more intense than this greenness, or weaker, or equal to it, even though both are under one genus, which is color. As for two things that are under two genera — there is no relation between them at all, even in what appears at first glance as a common feature, even if they ascend to one genus. For example: there is no relation between a cubit of water and the heat that is in pepper, because one is from the genus of quality and the other is from the genus of quantity; nor is there a relation between knowledge and sweetness, or between gentleness and bitterness, even though all of these are under the highest genus of quality. So how can there be a relation between Him, exalted be He, and any of His creatures — given the enormous difference in the reality of existence that cannot be more distant? Even if there were a relation between them, the accident of relation would attach to Him — and even if this is not an accident in His essence, exalted be He, it is in general some accident. So you cannot get free of affirming an attribute of Him even from the angle of relation upon strict investigation — yet relational attributes are the least objectionable of the attributes by which the Deity should be described, since they do not necessitate multiplicity of what is eternal, nor do they necessitate change in His essence, exalted be He, through change in what is related to Him.
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The fifth category of affirmative attributes: a thing is described by its action — and I do not mean by 'its action' the disposition of a craft that is in it, such as saying 'carpenter' or 'blacksmith,' since those are from the type of quality as we mentioned; rather I mean by 'its action' the act that it has done — such as saying 'Zayd is the one who built this door, who constructed such-and-such a wall, who wove this garment.' This type of attribute is remote from the essence of the thing described; therefore it is permissible to describe God, exalted be He, by it — after you know that these different actions do not require different meanings in the essence of the agent, as will be explained; rather all His different actions, exalted be He, are all from His essence, with no additional meaning, as we have explained.
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The summary of what is in this chapter is: He, exalted be He, is one from every direction, with no multiplicity in Him and no additional meaning beyond His essence; and the various attributes with multiple meanings found in the books that indicate Him, exalted be He, are from the angle of the multiplicity of His actions, not on account of any multiplicity in His essence — and some of them are to indicate His perfection, in accordance with what we consider perfection, as we have explained. As for whether it is possible for the one simple essence with no multiplicity in it to perform different actions — this will be explained by means of examples.