Stage 3 · Moses Maimonides (1138–1204)

Moreh Nevukhim: Part I, Chapter 74 — Seven Kalām Methods for Proving the World's Creation

דלאלהֵ אלחאירין — The Guide of the Perplexed

Chapter 74 presents and critiques the seven main kalām arguments for the world's temporal creation (ḥudūth al-ʿālam). Method 1 argues from the individual case of a generated thing (e.g., Zayd, who was once a sperm) to the whole; Method 2 argues from the finitude of generative chains; Method 3 argues from the contingency of atomic arrangements; Method 4 argues from accidents (all accidents are created, substances bear accidents, therefore substances are created); Method 5 is the argument from specification (takhṣīṣ) — the most favored; Method 6 argues from the world's contingency (it could have been otherwise); Method 7 argues from the persistence of souls. Maimonides critically evaluates each, showing they all depend either on the disputed kalam premises or on the permissibility principle (al-tajwīz), and that none constitutes a genuine philosophical demonstration.

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Part One · Chapter Seventy-Four — Seven Kalām Methods for Proving the World's Creation

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In this chapter I shall inform you of the proofs of the mutakallimūn for the world's being created. Do not require of me that I describe this in their expressions or their length; rather I shall inform you of the aim of each of them and the method of their argument for establishing the world's createdness or invalidating its eternity, and I shall alert you to the point where the defect lies.

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Method One: some of them claimed that from a single generated thing one can argue that the world is created — as if you said that the individual Zayd, who was once a sperm, then passed through state after state until he reached his completion, and it is impossible that he himself changed himself and moved himself from state to state — rather he has a changer other than himself.

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Method Two: they likewise said that from the createdness of an individual from among the reproducing individuals, the createdness of the entire world can be demonstrated. The explanation: this individual Zayd was not yet existing, then came into being; and since he can only be from the age of his father, his father is also created; and since his father can only be from the age of his grandfather, the chain must stop — reproduction cannot go on without end.

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Method Three: they said the atoms of the world can never be other than combined or separated; and atoms sometimes combine and at other times separate. It is clear that considered in themselves they are not necessitated only to combine or only to separate — for if their nature necessitated one of the two, they would never be free of it.

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Method Four: they said the entire world is composed of substance and accident, and no substance is free of one or more accidents; and all accidents are created; therefore it necessarily follows that the substance that bears them is also created — for everything that accompanies created things and is never free of them is itself created.

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Three premises are thus conceded in this method, which require what is not hidden from those who inquire: first, that what is without end by succession is impossible; second, that every accident is created; but our opponent who claims the world is eternal disputes the second premise — an existing, subsisting accident without end.

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Method Five — this is the method of specification. This method they favor most highly; its meaning goes back to what I explained to you in Premise Ten. One directs his thought to the world in its entirety, or to any part of it he chooses, and says: this could have been otherwise than it iswho specified it with these particular conditions?

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They branch this method out into many details, general and particular, so that they say: what makes the earth being beneath the water more appropriate than being above the water? Who specified this place for it?

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All this follows from conceding Premise Ten, in addition to the fact that some who claim the eternity of the world do not dispute us on specification, as I shall explain. In sum, in my view this is the best method, and I have a view on it that you will hear.

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Method Six: some later thinkers claimed to have found a very good method — better than all methods preceding — which is the preponderance of existence over non-existence. He said: the world is possible in existence according to everyone, for if it were necessarily existent it would itself be God, and we are speaking only of the world.

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Method Seven: some of the creationists also said that the createdness of the world is established by what the philosophers say about the persistence of souls. He said: if the world is eternal, the people who have died from eternity would be infinite in number; thus there would be souls infinite in number existing simultaneously.

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Some later philosophers dissolved this difficulty by saying: the persisting souls are not bodies that would require place and position, so an infinite number of them in existence is not impossible.

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Know that everyone who aims to establish the world's createdness or to invalidate its eternity by these kalām methods necessarily must employ one or both of these premises: Premise Ten — I mean the permissibility principle of the intellect.

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These are the mother-methods of the mutakallimūn for establishing the world's createdness. When they established by these proofs that the world is created, it necessarily follows that it has a Maker who created it with purpose, will, and choice; they then proceeded to show that He is one, by methods I shall explain to you in this chapter.

English is a working draft — alignment is sentence-by-sentence.