Stage 3 · Moses Maimonides (1138–1204)

Moreh Nevukhim: Part I, Chapter 56 — God, Likeness, and the Pure Equivocal

דלאלהֵ אלחאירין — The Guide of the Perplexed

Chapter 56 drives a wedge between God and every genus of existing things, and thereby closes off the possibility of defining Him. Maimonides begins from the logic of resemblance: similarity presupposes a shared genus — two things can be similar only if they fall under the same species or genus and thus share a defining attribute. God, by contrast, stands in no relation (nisba) to anything else whatsoever; therefore no similarity obtains between Him and any creature. From this Maimonides deduces that terms such as 'existent,' 'living,' 'knowing,' 'powerful,' and 'willing' — when applied to both God and creatures — are pure homonyms (ishtirāk maḥḍ), sharing nothing but the sound of the word. They are not even analogical predicates (bi-tashkīk), for analogy still requires some partial resemblance. The chapter closes with an urgent epistemological warning: one must never imagine that the divine attributes are somehow 'more' of what we mean when we use those words of ourselves. That error would replicate the genus-mistake in a subtler form.

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Part One · Chapter Fifty-Six — God, Likeness, and the Pure Equivocal

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Know that resemblance is a relation of sorts between two things. Any two things between which no relation can be posited — between those two no resemblance is conceivable; and likewise, whatever has no resemblance between them, no relation holds between them either. For example, one does not say that this heat resembles this color, nor that this sound resembles this sweetness — and that is a self-evident matter. Therefore, since the relation between us and Him, exalted be He — I mean between Him and everything other than He — is entirely absent, of necessity similarity too is absent. And know that any two things that are under a single species — that is, whose quiddity is altogether one, though they differ in size and smallness, or in intensity and weakness, or the like — those two necessarily resemble each other, even if they differ in that fashion of difference. For example, a mustard seed and the sphere of the fixed stars resemble each other in the three dimensions, even though one is at the extreme of largeness and the other at the extreme of smallness — the meaning of the existence of dimensions in both of them is one. Likewise, the wax melted in the sun and the element of fire resemble each other in heat, even though that heat is at the extreme of intensity and this heat is at the extreme of weakness — yet the meaning of the manifestation of this quality in both of them is one.

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And likewise ought to be understood by one who believes that there are essential attributes by which the Creator is described — namely, that He is existent, living, powerful, knowing, and willing — that these meanings are not attributed to Him and to us with a single meaning, the difference between those attributes and our attributes being only in the superlatives of greater, more perfect, more permanent, more stable; such that His existence is more stable than our existence, and His life more permanent than our life, and His power greater than our power, and His knowledge more perfect than our knowledge, and His will more universal than our will — and that a single shared meaning extends over both, as these people claim. The matter is not at all so; for the comparative form is only applied among things of which that meaning is predicated synonymously, and when that is the case, resemblance follows. Yet on their view — which holds that there are essential attributes — just as His essence, exalted be He, is necessarily unlike all essences, so too His essential attributes, as they claim, ought to be unlike all attributes, with no single shared meaning uniting them. But they do not proceed that way; rather they suppose that a single shared meaning does unite them, though without resemblance between the two.

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It has thus become clear to one who understands the meaning of resemblance, that 'existent' is said of Him, exalted be He, and of everything other than He, only by pure homonymy; and likewise, 'knowing,' 'powerful,' 'willing,' and 'living' are applied to Him, exalted be He, and to every possessor of knowledge, power, will, and life, only by pure homonymy — a homonymy in which there is absolutely no sharing of meaning between the two.

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And do not suppose that these terms are said by analogy of attribution; for terms said by analogy of attribution are those said of two things between which there is resemblance in some meaning — and that meaning is an accident in both of them, not constitutive of the essence of either. But the attributes ascribed to Him, exalted be He, are not accidents in the view of any of the speculative thinkers; while all these attributes of ours are accidents according to the opinion of the Mutakallimūn. So I would ask: whence does the resemblance arise, such that a single shared meaning could unite them and the predication be synonymous, as they claim? This is a conclusive proof that between the meaning of these attributes ascribed to Him and the meaning of those known to us there is no sharing whatsoever, under any condition — the sharing is in the name alone.

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Since that is so, one ought not to believe that there are meanings additional to the essence that resemble these attributes of ours — which are additional to our essence — merely because they share the same name. This meaning is of great majesty in the view of those who truly know; so guard it and master it properly, so that you will be prepared for what one wishes to make you understand.

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